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Preface
If we hold to the conviction all Canadians are equal, deserving of the same rights and
privileges, opportunities and obligations; if we truly believe those things to be self-evident, then
we must accept, embrace and pursue public policies which promote income equality and
wealth redistribution. Once it is generally accepted that the wealthy should share more of their
wealth with the poor through increased taxation burden, and by paying a greater share of the
costs of supplying public goods and services, opportunities to implement public policy that
achieve these outcomes are vast and far reaching.
A recent study has revealed that there is great discrepancy in what Canadians believe the
ideal distribution of wealth should be in Canada, what they perceive the current distribution of
wealth to be, and the actual distribution of wealth (Broadbent Institute, 2014). In short,
Canadians desire the distribution of wealth to be much fairer than they thought it was
currently, and the wealth inequality currently is greater than most Canadians thought it to be.
The table below was developed from data published in this study.

Wealth Distribution Category
Canadians ideal wealth distribution
Canadians perception of wealth
distribution
The actual distribution of wealth in
Canada

Poorest 20%
of Canadians

Middle 60% of
Canadians

11.5%
6%

58.5%
38.5

Wealthiest
20% of
Canadians
30%
55.5%

<1%

29%

70%

Additionally, the study indicated that the bottom 50% of Canadians own less than 6% of
the wealth, the top 50% own the remaining 94%, and the wealthiest 1% of Canadians own 20%
of the country’s wealth. This data suggests Canada is far from the socially progressive nation it
generally claims to be. As citizens, we can collectively determine public policy decisions that
redistribute the wealth in our country and in our local communities.
Far too often local governments hide behind the premise that income and wealth
redistribution is a responsibility of the Federal and Provincial Government, achieved through
the use of more appropriate redistributive revenue sources such as income and commodity
taxes. As a result of ignorance, or a general disregard for the ability to impact change, local
governments fail to acknowledge the role they can play in advancing social equity through
progressive local government public policy.
Canadians enjoy some of the most accessible and affordable drinking water in the world,
but the opportunity for progressive pricing policy should not be ignored as a result. The title of
this paper, WaterRight, is an adaptation of the title of a report which examined the state of
drinking water systems and provided advice on the organization and long-term financing of
Ontario’s water and wastewater systems (“WaterTight: The case for change in Ontario's water
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and wastewater sector”). The purpose of this report however will be to discuss the human right
to safe, clean and affordable drinking water, and local government influence in improving
affordability through progressive public policy (an area the WaterTight report generally
dismissed in the pursuit of regulatory compliance, quality assurance, and financial sustainability
of water systems).
By examining the cost of water in a cluster of communities in Southwestern Ontario in
relation to the average incomes in those communities, this report will answer the question:
How affordable is drinking water in Ontario communities, and how can municipal pricing
strategies improve affordability and advance social equity?
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Executive Summary
There is an extensive regulatory framework embodying the operational supply of drinking
water in Ontario, including the need for all municipalities to provide a self-sustaining financial
plan for their system. This has resulted in the price of water in Ontario significantly outpacing
the Consumer Price Index and general property taxation rates. This cost increase is impacting
Ontario residents, causing poorer residents to pay a larger percentage of their disposable
income on water required for basic human needs.
At the local level, water pricing is often established with little attention to how water rate
policy impacts affordability. While provincial regulation is thorough from a quality assurance
approach, it is silent on the matter of ensuring residential water affordability. Beyond aggregate
financial data collection and reporting through annual benchmarking and data collection
initiatives such as the annual BMA Management Consulting Inc. Municipal Competitiveness
Study (BMA Study), there is very little published work examining current water pricing, pricing
methodologies, and the affordability of water for Ontario residents.
Actual water rate data collected and examined from the eight most Southern
municipalities in Southwestern Ontario revealed:




There is great variation in water pricing between neighbouring communities.
Water can be considered very affordable in all communities examined, failing to reach
even 1% of average household income in all cases.
Water can be considered affordable in most cases for residents that rely on the basic
minimum income subsidies associated with the three main social support mechanisms
in Ontario (ODSP, Ontario Works, Guaranteed income supplement).

How governments elect to charge for public goods and services, the tools utilized to
recover costs, and the way in which those cost recovery tools are structured can have a
profound impact on the both public policy outcomes, as well as the share of financial burden
assumed by different groups in a community.
Municipalities wishing to implement intelligent and strategic tax policy to improve
affordability and social equity in their communities, can establish water rate models to achieve
the desired outcomes. In developing a more equitable pricing framework, municipalities can:




Use alternative revenue sources to cover the cost of supply water
Use strategic inclining block tariff structures to charge for water consumed
Minimize the fixed charges portion of residential water bills

Despite the general affordability of water, municipalities can determine pricing strategies
that shift some of the cost burden from those with the least ability to pay, to those with a
greater ability to pay, through the implementation of intelligent tax policy developed under a
strategically planned tax policy framework.
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Part 1: The Right to Water, Water Pricing, and Poverty
1.1 Introduction
As the treatment and supply of drinking water in Ontario is now almost entirely the
responsibility of local governments (primarily municipalities), the method of determining how
residents pay to access clean drinking water is quite diverse and locally determined. This
diversity in rate structure inevitably results in a variation of outcomes impacting water
affordability for residents, and has a variety of consequences that affect social equity. One such
consequence is that poorer residents end up paying a larger percentage of their disposable
income on water required for basic human needs (Wasimi & Hassa, 2012) (OECD, 2002). As the
concept of social equity can vary given the associated context, this paper will generally rely on
the National Academy of Public Administration definition, which defines social equity in
governance as: “The fair, just and equitable management of all institutions serving the public
directly or by contract; the fair, just and equitable distribution of public services and
implementation of public policy; and the commitment to promote fairness, justice, and equity in
the formation of public policy” (National Academy of Public Administration, 2017).
The lack of competition for the delivery of drinking water demands a level of diligent
financial oversight to ensure affordability, if not through provincial regulation, then checked by
way of popular opinion and balanced through election cycles. However, water pricing at the
local level is often established with little attention to how water rate policy impacts
affordability, leaving the real rates charged for water (or worse, the year over year cost
increase), to dominate the public debate (what little exists) on the matter. Provincial regulation
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is thorough from a quality assurance approach, and mandates water system financial plans, but
is silent on the matter of ensuring residential water affordability (Safe Drinking Water Act,
2002).
There is an extensive regulatory framework embodying the operational supply of drinking
water in Ontario, including the need for all municipalities to provide a self-sustaining financial
plan for their system. Depending on where one lives in the province, they may pay drastically
different prices for residential drinking water (BMA, 2015), determined under different sets of
factors used to calculate that price. Even more perverse, neighbouring municipal water utilities
within the same region, often with similar water supply management organization, charge
substantially different rates for drinking water. The different ‘sets of rules’, or ‘rate models’,
impact residential water affordability in different ways, and influence social equity in different
ways. One such way is to change the percentage of disposable income Ontario residents spend
on drinking water.
The aim of the research paper is to examine this variation in pricing and pricing
methodologies, to examine affordability generally and affordability for the poor in Ontario
specifically, and to make recommendations on the approach to water pricing policy in Ontario
that can improve affordability and advance social equity. Through examining the existing water
rates and water rate models implemented by a cluster of municipalities in Southwestern
Ontario, the variations can be used to compare, contrast, and examine these policy decisions
through a lens of affordability and social equity.
It is critical to initiate and participate in dialogue on matters of public importance. In the
context of affordable drinking water, this is true for all politicians and administrators who carry
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the burden of governance. In addition to the utilization of regressive water rate models used by
most municipalities, the price of water in Ontario is significantly outpacing the Consumer Price
Index and general property taxation rates; this is exacerbating the affordability concern. In the
period between 2005 and 2015 average water prices in Ontario rose 3.8% in major
municipalities (Di Matteo, 2016). Very little research has examined the impact this is having on
Ontario’s poor, with an eye to improving water pricing models to minimize the regressive
effects.
There are many public goods and quasi-public goods supplied by local governments in
Ontario that are funded through general property taxation; road services, parks services,
policing, fire services and recreation services to name a few. Property tax is a more regressive
tax tool than other forms of taxation, such as income tax, as the ability to pay the tax has less
correlation to the amount of tax charged. Additionally, property tax has shortcomings when
conceptualized as a ‘wealth tax’, since there is often great disparity in the market value of
property (from which the tax payable is calculated in Ontario) and the owned equity in the
property (Thompson, 2014). However, property taxation can be considered more progressive
than flat user fees, as people with higher incomes typically own more valuable homes (SACES,
2004). User fees on the other hand blatantly discriminate between the wealthy and the poor
unless they are linked to some form of income based subsidy.
The research conducted as part of this paper will examine the use of volumetric fees, in
conjunction with or as opposed to fixed user fees, and rely on the literature to further evaluate
this practice from a social equity perspective. One possibility is that the reliance on user fees is
linked more strongly to the ease and simplicity of measuring water consumption (water is

Page 10 of 57
supplied under pressure and every home can be easily equipped with a device to measure
exactly how much water is consumed), than to a sophisticated determination of appropriate
public policy or the appropriateness of user fees over general taxation. In other words, the
mechanisms used to recover the cost of supplying drinking water (user fees over taxation) seem
to be established more as a matter of convenience, than through strategic public policy
development. While social equity and affordability of water has received much attention in the
academic literature, the ability to pay typically plays a small role in the determination of water
rates in practice in Ontario.
This paper will also examine the affordability of water in the eight municipalities of
Windsor and Essex County. Using actual water rate data collected from the municipalities,
affordability will be measured using an internationally recognized drinking water affordability
threshold. This examination will occur both for income of the average household in the
community, as well as for the poorest residents, whose incomes are dependent on the
guaranteed minimum incomes established for the three primary income support programs in
the Province of Ontario. The cost of water, when compared against income and measured
against an affordability threshold, will reveal the level of affordability of drinking water in these
communities. The 2015 BMA Management Consulting Inc., Municipal Competitiveness Study
(BMA Study) will be used to examine the actual rate methodologies currently utilized by a large
sample of Ontario municipalities. By examining these pricing methodologies against the
expected policy outcomes of each model, insight can be gained into the level of sophistication
and fairness of the pricing models currently used in practice.
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Beyond aggregate financial data collection and reporting through annual benchmarking
and data collection initiatives such as the annual BMA Study, there is very little published work
examining current water pricing and pricing models in Ontario. Furthermore, literature
examining water rates from a social equity perspective in an Ontario context is even scarcer.
Most of the published literature examining water pricing in Canada is focused on the need to
establish pricing models that result in full cost recovery, though defining ‘cost’ can be rather
subjective as will be discussed later. Efforts during the literature review of this paper failed to
identify any research in the Canadian context that examined water rates through the lens of
affordability and social equity, though a number of studies of this nature have been conducted
in Europe, Australia, and other jurisdictions.
Every province in Canada has a unique model for the delivery of the provision of public
goods. How the costs of providing public goods and services are shared by the various levels of
governments (who pays for what and under what tax/revenue tool), will impact on the
preferred method of water pricing. As each component of the provision of service does not
exist in a vacuum, but forms an interrelated basket of public goods and support services, an
Ontario centric approach to the policy examination is of the utmost importance.
Water rate models instituted at the local level do have societal impact; some models are
progressive in nature, others are regressive. The poor spend a disproportionate amount of their
disposable income on buying drinking water compared to the wealthy. Municipalities have
great influence on the lessening or the worsening of this phenomena; the municipal sector
must understand this reality in order to make informed public policy decisions.
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1.2 Water and Poverty
The lack of access to clean, safe drinking water is a global crisis. Each day, over 2,000
children die from water borne illness (Liu & et al, 2012). This is one of the reasons why the
international community, and the UN has made access to drinking water a declared human
right (UNGA, 2010), and the expansion of drinking water systems, especially in the developing
world, a global humanitarian initiative. Beyond access, affordability of drinking water is also a
major global concern. Increased regulation, aging first and second generation water treatment
systems, difficulties in treating ever more polluted water, and the effects of global warming are
all driving up the cost of water for the consumer.
The global crisis of access and affordability of drinking water is not universally distributed.
As can be expected, some nations of the world, such as many countries on the continent of
Africa, and most in the Middle East, have significant access challenges, while other nations,
such as Canada, the United States and Brazil have an abundance of fresh water supply (UN
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2010). Similarly, some countries have
significant affordability challenges related to drinking water, while others have been recognized
as having no problems or concerns with water affordability (OECD, 2002). As an example, water
charges in Europe are on average four times higher than they are in Canada, making
affordability a much greater concern for European public policy makers (Vander Ploeg, 2011).
However, the relative affordability of Canadian drinking water should not preclude policy
makers from examining the impacts that pricing methodology, formed as part of an intelligent
tax policy framework, can have on advancing social equity and improving affordability for those
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who can least afford to pay. This paper will rely on the United Nations Development
Programme (UNDP) affordability threshold of requiring water cost to be less than 3% of
household income to be considered affordable (UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human
Rights, 2010).
Given that Canada is a nation that has been generally recognized as having neither access
or affordability challenges (when compared to other nations), it can be easy to assume that
access, and more relevant to this paper, affordability, is not a matter worthy of further
discussion or public policy consideration; such is not the case. Access to clean water on
Canadian First Nations reserves has been declared a crisis by Human Rights Watch (Human
Rights Watch, 2016). What general affordability indicators fail to recognize is the water
affordability challenges for the poorest Canadians. This paper will examine water affordability
for the poorest Canadians living in the province of Ontario. To do this, the basic minimum
subsidies associated with the three main social support mechanisms (ODSP, Ontario Works,
Guaranteed income supplement) will be examined to determine the amount of income that
these groups must devote to drinking water and sanitation. Regardless of the general
affordability of water, pricing methodologies can still be implemented to lessen the impacts of
the regressive nature of user fees, and shift costs from lower income households to higher
income households and to commercial enterprises.

1.3 The Human Right to Water
In 2010, the United Nations General Assembly recognized the Human Right to Water as
being essential to the full enjoyment of life (UNGA, 2010). The consequence of this resolution is
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to recognize that access to safe drinking water is a legal entitlement rather than a commodity
or service, and to make available the United Nations human rights system to monitor the
progress of nations in realizing the right to water while holding governments accountable (UNWater Decade Programme on Advocacy and Communication and Water Supply and Sanitation
Collaborative Council, 2011). In defining how the Human Right to water was to be determined,
the following five criteria were established: availability; accessibility; quality and safety;
affordability; and acceptability. With regards to affordability, the United Nations Development
Programme (UNDP) has identified water as affordable if costs do not exceed 3 per cent of
household income.
The concept of water as a human right brings forth the need to examine other
characteristics, such as; examining water as a public good, determining responsibilities for
providing service and owning infrastructure, the design of associated financial models, and
providing access to water for individuals with an inability to pay (Brown, Neves-Silva, & Hellor,
2016). It is primarily for these considerations, and the desire for sovereignty in managing their
own resources, that Canada elected to abstain from voting on the UN resolution (Water
Canada, 2010).
Ontario has some of the strictest water quality assurance regulations in the world (SDWA,
2002), but the supply of drinking water is much different for First Nations indigenous peoples
living on reserves. Currently, there are no binding regulations for the treatment and supply of
drinking water on First Nations Reserves in Canada (Human Rights Watch, 2016). As can be
expected, this has led to drastic underfunding of water treatment systems (where they do
exist), illness resulting from drinking inadequately treated water, and severe access issues on
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First Nations Reserves (Human Rights Watch, 2016). A staggering 73% of First Nations Water
Systems in Canada are at high to medium risk for contamination (The Council of Canadians,
2017). While 10% of people living in off-reserve communities in Ontario get their drinking water
from private wells (Environment Canada, 2011), that number doubles to 20% of households
living on reserves (Human Rights Watch, 2016). The crisis related to the lack of access to clean
drinking water on First Nations Reserves, described as being comparable to ‘third world
conditions’ (Levasseur & Marcoux, 2015), is considered by many to be a violation of the human
right to water (Suzuki, 2017), (Human Rights Watch, 2016). While this paper will not examine
the current state of water systems on First Nations Reserves, it must be acknowledged that
there are two very distinct narratives regarding the supply of drinking water in Canada; one for
indigenous peoples living on reserves, and another for everyone else.
Despite the United Nations resolution identifying clean drinking water as human right
essential to the full enjoyment of life and all other human rights, Canadian regulatory
requirements that mandate the delivery of all the criteria identified in UN declaration, and
affordability in particular, do not exist. Thus the organizations providing drinking water to
Ontario residents are not legally bound to ensure measures of affordability within their pricing
methodology.

1.4 The History of the Supply of Drinking Water in Ontario
1.4.1 In the Beginning
Like many utility corporations that are now considered to be a predominately
government owned or highly regulated industry, the first waterworks infrastructures built in
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cities in the Province of Ontario were developed under private ownership and were profit
generating ventures (Sancton, 2015). These systems typically served two purposes; to bring a
supply of untreated raw drinking water from lakes, and to provide a means to fight urban fires.
(OSWCA, 2001) The first water systems in Ontario were built in Toronto in the 1840’s (City of
Toronto, 2017). In the decades that followed, local and central governments saw the need to
be involved in the supply of water for the greater good of the people.
It took over a half a century for the two most significant pieces of provincial legislation of
the era affecting the safe supply of drinking water to be passed in the Province. The Municipal
Waterworks Act (1882) and the Public Health Act (1884) permitted the creation of municipal
water treatment facilities that could be paid for through property taxation, and the
establishment of the Public Health Board respectively. The Public Health Board used the Public
Health Act to manage matters that impacted water quality such as sanitary sewage disposal and
industrial discharge (OSWCA, 2001). As time progressed throughout the first half of the
twentieth century, research and advancement within the scientific and medical communities
identified the consumption of untreated water as a source of human illness, and water
treatment as a method for disease prevention.

1.4.2 Ontario Water Resources Commission
In the face of overwhelming evidence of the importance of safe clean drinking water on
human health, the polluting of the great lakes and the lack of a coordinated effort to build,
maintain and renew adequate water and wastewater facilities, the province of Ontario passed
the Ontario Water Resources Commission Act (1956) which established the Ontario Water
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Resources Commission. The Ontario Water Resource Commission, among other things, was
charged with regulating water treatment and supply in the province. The Commission financed,
built and operated water and wastewater systems and regulated the use of Ontario’s water
resources (Scott, 1969). It was through the OWRC that the first comprehensive inspection and
testing programs were developed in the province. Additionally, the OWRC developed the first
training, testing and licensing of water system operators (OSWCA, 2001).
Since the establishment of the OWRC (1956-1973), Ministry of the Environment
ownership, management and regulation (1973-1993), and the development of the Ontario
Clean Water Agency (a crown corporation established to address a regulator-owner/operator
conflict of the MOE, 1993-present), a provincial body has existed to provide drinking water
oversight responsibility and operational services to municipalities. Provincial involvement still
exists today in all aspects except infrastructure ownership which has been primarily the
responsibility of Ontario Municipalities in the years that followed the Water and Sewer Services
Improvement Act, 1997. The almost exclusive municipal ownership presented a localized
approach to water management, pricing and quality assurance; the latter resulting in a tragedy
of failed stewardship: the Walkerton Water Crisis.

1.4.3 The Impact of the Walkerton Water Crisis
A discussion on the provision of the delivery of water services by municipalities in Ontario
would be remiss if it did not include at least a brief discussion on the events surrounding the
Walkerton, Ontario water crisis. While this paper is primarily intended to examine affordability
and equity in water pricing, the Walkerton tragedy has played a dramatic role in expanding the
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quality assurance aspects of Ontario’s water system. This quality assurance program has
impacted water pricing. While it should not be argued that system safety should come at the
expense of affordable pricing, it should be recognized that the expanded regulatory
environment has led to greater operating expenses, and an expanded focus on sustainability.
This has in turn resulted in the rapid acceleration of water price increases at the local level.
In May 2000, the drinking water system of Walkerton Ontario, became contaminated
with a virulent strain of E. coli. Waste from a local cattle farm was washed into a shallow well
located near the farm as a result of heavy rains. Both the equipment installed to treat the
water, as well as the staff hired to manage the quality of the water, failed to deliver on the
expectations, though for very different reasons. In this town of 4,800 people, located within
Bruce County, 2,300 people became ill and seven died. Many of those who survived suffered
permanent damage to their health (Ministry of Public Infrastructure Renewal, 2005).
In the aftermath of the Walkerton crisis, inquiries were conducted and expert panels
assembled. In response to the recommendations of the inquiries, the Safe Drinking Water Act
was passed in 2002. The stated purpose of the Safe Drinking Water Act, 2002 is:
1. To recognize that the people of Ontario are entitled to expect their drinking water to
be safe.
2. To provide for the protection of human health and the prevention of drinking water
health hazards through the control and regulation of drinking water systems and
drinking water testing (SDWA, 2002).
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One of the main requirements of the Act is the mandatory licensing of municipal water
providers. While the regulatory framework has improved the quality assurance and regulatory
aspects of drinking water systems, it has also increased the cost of providing drinking water. In
the period between 2005 and 2015, average water prices in Ontario rose 3.8% in major
municipalities, outpacing both CPI as well as property taxation (Di Matteo, 2016). It would be
difficult to determine the exact impact the Walkerton water crisis (and the resulting legislation
and regulatory regime) had on water system affordability. However, the rapid acceleration of
regulatory requirements, the associated costs of compliance, the mandated financial planning
and sustainability requirements, coupled with the lack of general oversight with regards to
affordability, has generally resulted in increased costs to operate systems and thus increased
the cost of water for residents.

1.4.5 The Clean Water Act and Financial Plans for Municipal Water Systems
After the events of the Walkerton, ON water tragedy briefly explored earlier, the Ontario
government passed the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA), 2002 in order to more effectively
control and regulate drinking water systems. In 2007, the Province of Ontario enacted
Regulation 453/07 under the SWDA. This regulation required all municipal drinking water
systems to develop a financial plan, in accordance with the regulation, prior to obtaining or
renewing their drinking water license.
The Financial Plans of a Municipal Drinking Water System must:
i)

include a statement that the financial impacts of the drinking water system have
been considered

ii)

apply for a period of at least six years
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iii)

include details of the proposed or projected financial operations of the drinking
water system

iv)

projected financial position of the drinking water system

v)

proposed or projected gross cash receipts and gross cash payments

vi)

be available to members of the public

vii)

give a copy of the financial plans to the Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing.

As can be seen from the seven mandatory requirements, much discretion is afforded to
local municipalities in determining the means to a financially sustainable end. Mandatory
financial plans require municipalities to price water such that the water system is sustainable in
both the short and long term. How municipalities typically determine the method to determine
pricing is explored below.

1.5 Water Pricing Models
When a government supplies drinking water to their residents, there are a number of
different pricing models they can implement to recover the cost of operating the system. While
if estimated accurately, these models can all be used to collect enough revenue to cover costs,
these models impact affordability, equity, and water conservation in different ways. Most
pricing models will generally fall into one of the following categories:

1.5.1 No Direct Charges to Users
Some governments have elected to not charge for drinking water directly, instead
electing to cover the cost of drinking water through other taxation mechanisms. This can either
be a result of the lack of sophistication of the drinking water treatment or supply system (many
poorer nations), or because of specific public policy decisions not to charge. As an example, the
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country of Ireland did not directly charge for drinking water until 2014 (The Irish Times, 2014).
Public policy makers in Ireland chose instead to fund the cost of drinking water through other
taxation mechanisms. If it were not for the austerity measures imposed on Ireland by the
European Union and the International Monetary Fund under terms of the 2009 bailout package
(which required Ireland to begin charging for water and wastewater services), the model of no
direct charges would likely still be in place today (McIntyre, 2014).

1.5.2 Flat Fee Per Connection
The least sophisticated of all pricing models is the flat fee pricing model. Every user is
charged a fee for their connection and access to water, based on the type of connection (i.e.
residential, commercial, industrial). Under this pricing model, there are no meters installed and
therefore no volumetric charges. This results in very high volume users of water paying the
same cost for access and usage as very small volume users of water. To achieve financial
sustainability, the total cost of supplying drinking water in a given municipality is divided by the
number of users, and the result determines the cost the user will pay for access to water. The
benefits of this model are primarily related to the simplicity in development and management.
The shortcomings include the lack of incentive to conserve and unfairness (as cost is not tied to
consumption). With regards to conservation, residential users in Canada under a flat user rate
system consume 65% more water on average per capita than users with meters and volumetric
charges (Environment Canada, 2011).
The flat fee per connection model can be illustrated as follows:
F = TC/U
F=Fee per User; TC=Total Cost of Water; U=Number of users of the system
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1.5.3 Volumetric Charges
To have a fee system based on volumetric charges, each user must be connected to a
meter which measures the volume of consumption and charges users a fee based on the
amount of water they consume. Most water systems that utilize a volumetric pricing strategy,
also incorporate a fixed charge(s) in addition to the volumetric charge. The fixed charge
component is intended to provide a degree of revenue stability for system operators. The value
of the fixed charge in relation to the volumetric charges and ultimately the total bill is a matter
of local policy. It is important to note however that the greater the fixed charge in relation to
volumetric charges, the less incentive there is to conserve water through less consumption, and
the lesser the degree of control a user has over the relative cost of water. In the examination of
municipal billing structures discussed later in this paper, the municipalities reviewed had a fixed
charge component ranging from a low of 24% to a high of 62%. While a 62% fixed charge
provides greater revenue stability, it discourages conservation and increases the average cost
of water for lower volume water users.
Within the volumetric charge pricing framework, there are different approaches to
pricing each unit (typically a cubic meter in Canada), of water consumed. These approaches
include the following:
Flat Rate Volumetric Charge
In a flat rate volumetric charge approach, every volumetric unit consumed is billed out at
the same rate or price regardless of the total volume consumed. This can include a model that
charges all users of the system the same price per unit, or a model that differentiates users by
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class (i.e. residential, commercial, industrial) and establishes a rate for each class that may or
may not be the same as the other classes.
Inclining Block Tariff
Inclining block tariff structures increase the cost per unit of water as consumption rises
beyond established thresholds. This model is generally considered to be the most effective
model to promote conservation as users pay a higher fee for a volumetric unit of water once
certain consumption volume thresholds are surpassed. Additionally, equity in pricing is
improved in this model as higher volume users pay more on average per unit of consumption
than do lower volume users. Since high income households consume more water than low
income households (Wasimi & Hassa, 2012), wealthier users contribute more to covering the
costs of operating the water system by paying a higher average unit of cost than poorer users.
Declining Block Tariff
Declining block tariff structure decreases the cost per unit of water as consumption rises
beyond established thresholds (similar to inclining block tariff, only in reverse). The rates
charged per unit of water begins with the most expensive rate, then declines as consumption
increases, ending in the least expensive rate per unit being the last unit consumed. While this
model is generally recognized to have efficiency benefits typically associated with volume
discount incentives, it is the least effective at managing the conservation aspect of water use.
Fixed charges are able to be spread over more units with the promotion of a greater
consumption, thus decreasing the average rate charged as consumption volumes increase. The
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implementation of this pricing structure places system revenue maximization above
conservation or pricing equity.
Humpback Tariff
The humpback tariff model utilizes both an inclining block structure for the first blocks of
consumption, until eventual price plateauing, followed by a declining block structure for very
large volume users. This structure is implemented with the intent of promoting conservation
for most users of the system (typically residential), while providing volume discounts for large
users (industrial, commercial) of the system to recognize the declining incremental cost of
supplying an additional unit of water to the user.
A Mix of Fixed Charges and Volumetric Charges
To try and address the revenue volatility associated with the sole use of volumetric
charges, most municipalities utilize a combination of fixed monthly fees, in addition to
volumetric charges (based typically on one of the four volumetric charge methodologies
discussed above). As municipalities have large fixed costs associated with the treatment and
distribution of drinking water, fixed charges help to guarantee a base amount of annual
expected income. Thus for many water consumers in Ontario, there will be a minimum monthly
charge (the fixed charge component), in addition to volumetric charges. Determining the ratio
between fixed and volumetric charges varies from water provider to water provider, and is
determined through local policy decisions. The higher the ratio of fixed fees, the more the
system will resemble a flat fee pricing method, and the less the incentive to conserve (though
revenue certainty for the utility increases). With a low ratio of fixed charges to volumetric
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charges, the greater amount of the household water bill will be linked to consumption, the
greater incentive to conserve, and the user will more control over the amount of the bill.
A 2015 survey of water rate structures of 100 Ontario municipalities revealed that 89% of
municipalities have a fixed charge component built in to their pricing methodology. Of the 100
municipalities, the fixed charge component of the bill ranged from 100% (flat fee per
connection) of the bill to 0% (all volumetric charges) of the bill (BMA, 2015). Overwhelmingly,
the preferred billing methodology is a volumetric charge methodology (97%), with a fixed
charge component (89%), using a uniform/flat rate volumetric charge per unit (65%). Additional
details regarding the way in which municipalities are charging for water (and wastewater), are
found in Table 1 below.
Table 1: Ontario Municipal Water Rate Structures: 2015
Water
Rate Billing
Structure

Water Rate
Structure ‐
Res.

Water Rate
Structure ‐
Non‐Res.

WW Rate
Structure ‐
Res.

WW Rate
Structure ‐
Non‐Res.

Uniform

65%

66%

67%

68%

Declining

12%

14%

12%

13%

Inclining

9%

7%

7%

6%

Humpback

11%

11%

11%

11%

Flat

3%

2%

3%

2%

*Source: 2015 BMA Study

The fact that only 3% of municipalities surveyed are using the flat fee per connection is a
signal that Ontario municipalities are becoming more sophisticated in the management and
pricing of their water systems. As was discussed earlier, charging for water based on volume
consumed will lead to water conservation. Of the 97% using volumetric billing structures
however, only 32% have implemented the next level of sophistication (inclining, declining and
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humpback), in an attempt to strategically manage consumer consumption, user cost sharing,
and to achieve specific public policy outcomes.

1.6 Public Goods and Services, Taxation and User Fees
How governments elect to charge for public goods and services, the tools utilized to
recover costs, and the way in which those cost recovery tools are structured can have a
profound impact on both public policy outcomes, as well as the share of financial burden
assumed by different groups in a community. The relatively recent push towards water system
financial sustainability has driven most municipal systems to recover the cost of providing
drinking water through a user fee system. As flat user fees are blatantly indiscriminate between
the rich and the poor, a strategic approach must be taken to develop a more intelligent user fee
system which can have positive policy outcomes.
There are a vast array of public goods and services provided by the Federal government,
Provincial/Territorial governments, and Municipal governments in Canada. Sections 91-95 of
the 1867 Constitution determined jurisdictional authority through the distribution of legislative
powers over goods and services supplied to the Canadian people, and which level; federal or
provincial, has jurisdiction in that sphere (Beaudoin, 1990). Municipalities are not
constitutionally guaranteed in Canada, but are created, and afforded the ability to exist,
through provincial legislation. All authorities to act are granted to municipalities through
provincial legislation. In Ontario, the primary piece of legislation is the Ontario Municipal Act,
2001, though there are many other Acts that grant powers and demand obligations of Ontario
municipal corporations.
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The chart below illustrates some of the more important public goods and services
provided to Canadian residents, and the level of government designated jurisdictional authority
under the Constitution. Again, all municipal authority is actually an authority of the provincial
government, delegated to municipalities through provincial legislation.
Table 2: Legislative Authority in Canada
Federal jurisdiction











Trade
Taxes
Postal service
Militia and defence
Currency and banks
Indian policies
Criminal law
Residual powers (not
defined in the British
North America Act)
Right of disallowance
over the provinces

Provincial jurisdiction

Shared jurisdiction















Public lands and
forests
Health system
Municipal
institutions
Marriage
Property and civil
rights
Education
Business licences
Provincial
constitution
Shared jurisdiction








Agriculture
Companies and
economic
development
Prisons and justice
Fishing
Public works
Transportations
and
communications
Immigration

Source: (University of Ottawa, 2017). https://slmc.uottawa.ca/?q=laws_canada_legal

With the exception of targeted Federal and Provincial grants and transfer payments, as
well as restrictions on the use of some charges levied upon residents, developers and business
for specific purposes, municipalities have relative freedom in determining how to fund the cost
of supplying goods and services to residents. The primary sources of revenue under the direct
control of municipalities include property taxation, and user fees and charges. The policy
decisions that municipal Councils make regarding what goods and services will be funded from
what revenue source, and how those user fees and taxation rates are determined, can have an
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impact on social equity (either positively or negatively) and make goods and services available
and affordable to a broader range of residents. The policy decisions can also limit the access to
goods and services due to unaffordability, and create excessive burden on the poorest
residents. The two primary own source revenue tools available to municipalities will now be
explored in more detail.

1.6.1 Property Taxation
The History of Property Tax
The concept of taxing property is far from a modern phenomenon. Some of the earliest
documented practices of systematic property taxation came from the ancient Egyptians (5000
B.C.), who applied taxation policies associated with production value of privately owned lands
(on items such as crop yields and livestock production) (Carlson, 2005). During medieval times
in western civilizations, taxes on land, production resulting from land, and taxes on personal
property were levied by both church and state (who in many respects were indistinguishable
from one another during that era). In more modern times, one of the first forms of property
taxation in the ‘new world’ was implemented by the Puritans in Boston, who levied property
tax to pay for the church and the religious education of their children. It was in Boston that
some of the first modern practices of levying property tax to pay for local services such as
policing, education, defense and various forms of public infrastructure, were implemented in
North America (Carlson, 2005).
This very brief historical review of property tax is intended to illustrate that the act of
taxing property has been used since the dawn of civilization, and continues to be used today
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almost everywhere in the developed world. It should be expected that the practice of taxing
property will exist well into the foreseeable future, and property taxation is expected to remain
the primary source of revenue for municipalities.
Property Tax in Ontario
Despite property tax representing only 10.5% of the total tax burden of the average
Canadian family, property tax is commonly recognized as a very unpopular form of taxation. At
10.5%, property tax ranks fourth, behind income tax (30.6%), payroll and health taxes (21.5%),
and sales/commodity tax (14.4%) (Fraser Institute, 2015). Despite this relatively small share of
the overall tax burden, property tax funds a large breadth of direct public services to residents.
It has been suggested that the incremental nature of other taxes, such as a weekly payroll
deduction of income tax or a percentage mark up on the purchase of goods and services in the
form of a sales tax, makes other forms of taxation less visible to the taxpayer (Slack, 2002). In
contrast, a limited number of large installments (as is the process for most property tax billing
cycles), results in much larger and more impactful payment process. This process is also
accompanied by a limited time to pay and in most cases, significant penalties for late payment.
Economists seem to dislike property taxes for different reasons altogether. Some view
property tax as a tax on capital, often considered the worst type of taxation in terms of harming
economic activity (Bird & Slack, 2002). Others will argue the regressive nature of property
taxation, citing the fact that lower income earners pay a higher percentage of their income on
property tax than do higher income earners (Thompson, 2014). Additionally, the ability to pay
property taxes, despite the owned ‘wealth’ associated with the value of property, is a major
shortcoming of taxing property based on assessed market value. This is especially true in
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jurisdictions where market conditions have increased property values without a corresponding
rise in property owner incomes.
The property tax system in Ontario today includes a number of organizations and
stakeholders, with specific areas of authority and responsibility as outlined in Table 3 below.
Table 3: The Ontario System of Property Assessment and Taxation
Organization:

Responsibility:

The Province of Ontario

Determine Provincial property tax policy,
impose legislation to support tax policy.

The Municipal Property Assessment
Corporation

Determine assessment value and tax
classification of properties.

Municipalities

Determine local tax policy, set tax rates, tax
ratios, administer property tax collection and
inter-governmental distribution.

The Assessment Review Board

Independent adjudicative tribunal to hear
appeals of assessed value, tax class, tax
appeals.

Property Owner

Pay the levy imposed based on the assessed
value of the property.

Source: (MPAC, 2016)

Municipal Tax Policy and Policy Framework:
Whether explicitly stated, adequately planned, or competently implemented, any
municipal mechanism that raises financial resources for the delivery of services should be
considered tax policy. In its simplest form, "a policy is a course of action or inaction chosen by
public authorities to address a given problem or interrelated set of problems" (Pal, 2010). Thus
any decision to tax, raise funds or charge fees, can be interpreted as tax policy. It is not the
individual tax policy decisions that are of significance, rather it is the adequacy and
comprehensiveness of the municipal approach to tax policy framework development,
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implementation, and analysis that has the greatest impact on shaping the future of a
municipality. Unlike ‘policy’, which can reflect the narrowest of decisions made by a
municipality, a ‘policy framework’ is a visionary approach that provides the rationale and
philosophy to guide policy and program development (Province of British Columbia, 2000).
A municipal tax policy framework is intimately related to each and every other policy
framework developed within a municipality. Taxation allows for the delivery of a social policy
framework (quality of life considerations, equality, etc.), of an infrastructure policy framework
(sustainability, development, environmentalism, etc.), or any other policy framework
established by the municipality. As the lack of formal tax policy framework development and
analysis often leads to economically inefficient taxation, (Kennedy & McAllister, 2005) a formal
policy framework will aid in avoiding haphazard and unguided taxation decisions.
A tax policy framework will act as the cornerstone for establishing individual tax policy
decisions, as is demonstrated by exploring the setting of user fees for a recreation complex. At
one extreme, the recreation complex could be used by residents at no charge, thus funding
operations entirely through the general tax levy. This inclusionary approach would open access
to the facility for all members of the community, a truly progressive approach to providing
recreational services. At the other extreme, a municipal recreation complex could be mandated
to be financially self-sustaining, generating enough revenues through high user fees to cover all
expenses. This approach would create exclusivity of access, benefitting those that can afford to
pay high the fees, and excluding those that cannot. The reality is most municipalities have a tax
policy model that establishes fees somewhere in between, relying on user fees to cover a
portion of the expenses and taxation to cover the remainder. Determining the balance of
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taxation funded versus user fee funded is a matter of tax policy. The push towards selfsustaining financial plans for water services has led to a greater reliance on direct user fees,
increasing the relative cost burden for poorer residents.
Municipal tax policy developed under a comprehensive framework will be less susceptible
to a ‘flavor of the day’ approach to policy development, and will be more resistant to the
negative aspects of policy diffusion. Policy diffusion, where policies spread from one
municipality to another, is not always positive (Shipman & Volden, 2012). The imitation and
coercion mechanisms of policy diffusion can produce unintended consequences for the policy
adopter, leading to unintended consequences such as a race to the bottom and the erosion of
social equity programs (Shipman & Volden, 2012).
Intelligent Tax Policy
The public expects government to make intelligent decisions, not just decisions (Pal,
2010).
“Intelligent decisions come from operating within some consistent framework, however
general….. the very nature of intelligent and accountable governance in a democracy
demands more than mere decisions-it demands decision making guided by a framework.
In short, we expect that our governments have policies” (Pal, 2010).
Through establishing tax policies, municipalities have the opportunity to shape the structure
and future of their communities (Kennedy & McAllister, 2005). The annual budget document is
the way in which municipalities typically set tax policy in practice. While the annual budget is in
fact a policy document as defined above, there is an important distinction between decisions
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and intelligent decisions as noted by Pal. Without an established policy framework, intelligent
policy decisions contained in the budget can only occur through happenstance and it is unlikely
that the most appropriate tax policy decisions will be made in the absence of a framework. It is
not enough to participate in a process of annual expenditure allocation, service level review,
and tax rate and user fee determination. While establishing tax rates and collecting funds to
pay for goods and services does represent tax policy (as illustrated above), these decisions must
all flow from a pre-established tax policy framework in order to be considered intelligent. As is
the case for income tax policies, modern evidence and experiences must be considered when
analyzing existing property tax policy and developing policy goals for the future (Milligan, 2014).
Dedicated Resources and Research Blueprints:
One of the challenges facing municipalities in developing a tax policy framework is rooted
in the complexity of the policy considerations, and the resources needed to adequately analyze
and predict expected outcomes. At the Federal level, the Department of Finance has a
dedicated tax policy branch. This branch is responsible for researching and analyzing the
expected outcomes of various tax policy considerations, and for generating suggested
alternative tax policy considerations (Ernewein & Horsman, 2013).
There appears to be minimal policy research that can be relied upon by municipalities to
understand and anticipate the outcomes of their tax policy decisions. As a result, there is a lack
of appropriate analysis, development, documentation and publication of tax policy decisions.
This in turn results is very little strategic tax policy decisions at the municipal level beyond short
term financial sustainability found in the annual budget process.
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1.6.2 User Fees
Perhaps the greatest threat to progressiveness in municipal tax policy frameworks is the
ever increasing reliance on user fees, a phenomenon that has been occurring in the drinking
water sector. Property taxes are often cited as problematic due to the regressive nature of the
tax, with a lack of association between the amount of tax paid, and the income of the payer.
While the progressive nature of income tax improved income equality in Canada by 11%, the
effect of property tax eroded the income inequality achieved by income tax by 2% (Chawla &
Wannell, 2003). Further, households with an income below $20,000 paid over 10% of their
household income on property tax, while households with incomes above $100,000 paid less
than 2% (Palameta & Macredie, 2005). Unlike income taxes in Ontario, where the tax rate
applied increases with greater amount of income earned, the Municipal Act, 2001 only permits
graduated property tax rates on commercial and industrial property classes. Thus a home
valued at $1 million will pay the same property tax rate as a $100,000 home in the same
municipality (though 10 times the total tax). Despite concerns related to property taxes and the
ability to pay, there is at least a positive correlation between income and home values
(Hancock, 2004), and thus an outcome where wealthier people, who own more valuable
homes, pay more property tax. Such is not the case with flat user fees.
Flat user fees charge the same fee per household regardless of the consumption or use of
the good. This would be reflected in the ‘Flat Fee’ water pricing model discussed earlier. This
results in the wealthiest of residents paying the same for public services, such as for the supply
of drinking water, as the poorest residents. This outcome makes flat user fees the most
regressive income source for local government revenues. There are user fee models for
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drinking water that improve the progressivity of user fees when they are linked to volumetric
consumption and utilize inclining block pricing that provides at a very low cost (or no cost at all)
a volume of water required for basic human needs.

Part 2: The Affordability of Water in Windsor and Essex County
2.1 Literature Review
The published literature which explores the nature of water services, the affordability of
water and the ways in which water should be priced, and the concept of social equity and
fairness in water pricing, is quite extensive. This literature seems to suggest a consensus
recognition of the trade-off between equity and efficiency in pricing the provision of the water
services. In addressing, (or failing to address) this trade-off, the research typically takes one of
three approaches. The approach depends greatly on whether water is being defined primarily
as a private good (efficiency is dominant), as a public good (equity is dominant), or if the
author(s) strives to address both economic efficiency with equity (equity and efficiency are
balanced).
Efficiency is dominant: much of this line of research chooses to ignore the social equity
consideration, focusing instead on pure economic and financial considerations in the pricing of
water as a commodity. This research focuses on either capturing the ‘full-cost’ of providing
water services and recommends a correlating pricing model that covers this cost, or by
empirically suggesting that the current price being charged for water in the study area fails to
even address direct cost of providing service. In the former, this includes capturing more
abstract cost concepts in the provision of water services such as a rate of return on capital,
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environmental costs such as pollution, raw water costs, and costing similar externalities
associated with the consumption of energy in the supply of water (Renzetti & Kushner, Full Cost
Accounting for Water Supply and Sewage Treatment: Concepts and Case Application, 2004)
(Dupont & Renzetti, 2008). The latter examines actual cost recoveries through rates against the
required revenues to maintain full cost recovery, concluding that rates are too low which
results in over-consumption and a general lack of conservation.
Equity is dominant: Interpreting water as more of a public good results in various research
conclusions supporting matters such as the human right to water in an affordable and socially
equitable manner (Meier & et al, 2014) (Butts & Gasteyer, 2011)., Similar research focuses less
on determining whether the price charged for water is adequate to cover costs of providing the
service, as is the case when efficiency is dominant, and instead determines the affordability of
water for poor citizens, the ability to pay, and the benefit received (Pashardes & Hajispyrou,
2002). Building on the importance of water affordability, the research examines water pricing
models, both utilized in practice or conceptualized in theory, that improve the affordability of
water and improve social equity (Butts & Gasteyer, 2011) (Teodoro M. P., 2005) (Barberan &
Arbues, 2009), (Wasimi & Hassa, 2012) (Goffa & Crow, 2014).
Equity and efficiency are balanced: Still other research examines the issue of water pricing
while attempting to strike a balance between equity and efficiency in water pricing
determination. This research explores the social considerations of affordability, ability to pay
and benefit received, against efficiency measures such as full cost recovery, price, marginal
benefit and cost parity, and conservation (Rogersa & et al, 2002) (Porcher, 2014) (Renzetti & et
al, 2015).
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Efficiency trade-offs and the externalities related to matters of conservation and preservation,
cannot be ignored and must form part of any pragmatic and responsible water pricing model. A
short description of existing literature aligning closely to this research paper includes the
following:
Organization for Economic Development and Co-Operation, Social Issues in the Provision and
Pricing of Water Services, 2002, Paris.
The Organization for Economic Development and Cooperation examined the links
between social issues and the pricing of water services. The report examined many aspects of
the provision of water services provided by member countries, focused on the affordability of
water services, and examined the social measures used by participating countries to address
the issue of water affordability.
The report identified:
i)
ii)

iii)

iv)

The increasing cost of water service and the prediction of continued cost increases
The formal evidence of water affordability problems for low income households
given income levels and the burden of water costs. The report suggested
affordability problems in half of the member countries, either now or in the
foreseeable future
The two main policy categories being implemented to address affordability
challenges; income support and tariff adjustment, and the different ways in which
both policy options were being used to address water affordability concerns.
As the cost of water continues to rise, there will be an increasing need for
governments to address the affordability challenges through the use of the income
support and tariff adjustment.
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Teodoro, Manuel P., Measuring Fairness: Assessing the Equity of Municipal Water Rates.
American Water Works Association, 97 (4) 2005.
This research developed metrics to measure water rate equity. The stated goal of the
research was to provide information and education to those charged with determining water
rates, and to provide additional tools in the rate setting process. The research identifies equity
scores for individual water customers, as well as progressivity indexes for various water rate
structures.
Wasimi, S. A. and Hassa, S., "Social Considerations in Domestic Water Pricing: A Case Study of
Perth, Western Australia". Australian Journal of Water Resources, 15(2) 2012.
The researcher conducted an in-depth examination of the existing Increasing Block Tariff
(IBT) water rate structure of the City of Perth, Australia, in an attempt to identify a water rate
structure that optimizes social equity. The researchers used an optimization tool to determine
recommended block sizes and pricing tiers, while considering economic, environmental and
social factors. Social considerations were operationalized into variables such as household size,
incomes, etc. The pricing scheme was operationalized into fixed portions, various consumption
blocks, and associated pricing blocks. The researchers were able to suggest a socially optimal
IBT pricing model for the Perth water system through their research.
Ramón Barberán, Fernando Arbués. “Equity in Domestic Water Rates Design”, Water
Resources Management, 23(10) 2009.
The stated objective of this paper was to examine the operational effectiveness of the
equity criterion in domestic water rate design. Much like the intent of this research paper, the
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authors were interested in contributing to a solution to the equity problems caused by the
application of water rates. In particular, the authors were examining the impact of the
increasing block tariff rate structure in relation to household size. The paper establishes and
defines normative criteria used in determining equitable water pricing as follows:
i)

ii)

iii)

iv)

Full Cost Recovery: Revenues collected through the water rate design should cover
expenditures resulting in a self-sustaining financial model or ‘budget selfsufficiency’.
Efficiency: The maximizing of net community benefit, such that users will buy water
in a quantity that gives a marginal benefit higher than the marginal cost, often
adjusted for environmental considerations.
Equity: Includes philosophical and social considerations as well as value judgements.
Approaches to equity include the benefit principle and the ability to pay principle.
The former establishes pricing based on the benefit received, and is more suitable
when the consumer has options, the latter better suited for public goods.
Simplicity: Rate structures should be cost-efficient to implement and manage, and
the users of the system need on understand the system and the consequence of
their actions.

The author then conducts a case study on Zaragoza, Spain. Based on an analysis and using the
normative criteria, the article then proposes a design for a more equitable increasing block
tariff water rate that ensures individuals will be able to meet their basic water needs at the
same cost, regardless of the size of the household in which they live.

2.2 The Affordability of Water in Southwestern Ontario
Canada is globally recognized as having both accessible and affordable water for its
citizens (Vander Ploeg, 2011). The access and affordability achievements are not universal
however, with remote and indigenous communities struggling to build, operate and maintain
adequate treatment facilities (Human Rights Watch, 2016). Furthermore, while affordability
may be, on average, well within the range of affordability targets for the average population,
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rising water rates may be posing affordability challenges for the poor of Ontario. This research
will examine this consideration in more detail.
In order to examine water affordability in Southwestern Ontario, actual water rate data,
both the rate model used, as well as the actual charges, was collected from the eight most
Southern municipalities in Southwestern Ontario which make up the County of Essex and the
City of Windsor. These municipalities include the Town of Amherstburg (Amherstburg), the
Town of Kingsville (Kingsville) the Town of Lakeshore (Lakeshore), the Town of Lasalle (LaSalle)
the Town of Tecumseh (Tecumseh), the Town of Essex (Essex), the City of Windsor (Windsor)
and the Municipality of Leamington (Leamington).
The average water used per person per day in Canada; 251 liters (Environment Canada,
2014) multiplied by the average persons per household in Ontario; 2.6 (Statistics Canada, 2011),
reveals the average Ontario household consumes just under 20 cubic meters of water per
month. The 20 cubic meter average monthly water consumption was then used to calculate the
average annual water bill for the nine communities examined using published 2016 Water
Rates for the communities. The results are noted in Table 4 below:
Table 4: Average Annual Cost of Water per Household
Monthly Fixed
Municipality Charge
Kingsville
LaSalle
Tecumseh
Leamington
Windsor
Amherstburg
Lakeshore
Essex

$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$

5.67
15.00
12.62
21.06
24.42
20.05
19.62
18.92

Cubic Meters/
Person / Year

Cost / M3
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$

0.90
0.87
1.13
0.79
0.52
1.06
1.44
1.48

92
92
92
92
92
92
92
92

Average Persons Average Annual
/ Household
Cost / Household
2.6
2.6
2.6
2.6
2.6
2.6
2.6
2.6

$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$

282
387
421
441
472
493
578
580
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As is demonstrated above, there is great variation in water pricing, even within this cluster of
communities in Southwestern Ontario. The highest annual cost (Essex) is over twice the cost of
the lowest cost municipality (Kingsville).
While this paper is primarily examining the affordability of water services, a brief look at
costs to provide sanitary services should also be explored in this section. The gross cost for the
average Ontario household reviewed above does not take into account associated sewer
surcharge costs. While one could argue that the sewer surcharge is applied for a completely
different municipal service, most municipalities, including all of those examined in
Southwestern Ontario, apply a mandatory sewer surcharge to user water bills, most of which is
calculated based on water consumption. From a payment perspective, these public utilities
treat the charges as one in the same. If a resident is to be supplied water, they must also pay a
mandatory sewer surcharge if the service is available to them. This charge typically pays for the
cost to collect, convey, and treat sanitary sewage. Much like the regressive nature of water
charges, sanitary surcharges are the same for all residential users of the system, charging low
income households the same rates as high income households. Table 5 indicates annual sewer
surcharge costs in the subject municipalities.
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Table 5: Average Annual Sewer Surcharge per Household
Monthly Fixed
Municipality Charge
Kingsville*
LaSalle
Tecumseh
Leamington**
Windsor
Amherstburg
Lakeshore
Essex

$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$

24.52
6.00
12.62
42.19
15.87
30.46
15.07
19.16

Cubic Meters/
Person / Year

Cost / M3

$
$
$
$
$
$

0.87
1.16
2.35
2.06
1.30
1.68

92
92
92
92
92
92
92
92

Average Persons Average Annual
/ Household
Cost / Household
2.6
2.6
2.6
2.6
2.6
2.6
2.6
2.6

$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$

294
279
428
506
750
856
490
630

*Billing structure includes only fixed charges
** 21 m3 per month included in fix charge. Average Consumption above < 21m3 per month.

The gross costs examined in tables 4 and 5 provide simply that, average cost of the
service. In order to understand affordability of water generally, these costs must compared
against household income, and examined using a measure of affordability. Therefore Table 6
below introduces average household income to the examination of gross water costs to
determine the average percentage of house hold income currently allocated to the purchase of
drinking water in these communities. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
affordability threshold of requiring water cost to be less than 3 % of household income to be
considered affordable, will be relied upon to determine affordability (UN Office of the High
Commissioner for Human Rights, 2010).
The UN-Water Decade Programme on Advocacy and Communication and Water Supply
and Sanitation Collaborative Council has determined that the cost for water and sanitation
facilities and services should not exceed 5% of a household’s income. If this is achieved, it
should not affect the ability to purchase other services such as food, housing, health and
education. (UN-Water Decade Programme on Advocacy and Communication and Water Supply
and Sanitation Collaborative Council, 2011).
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TABLE 6: Water, Wastewater, and Combined Costs as a Percentage of Household Income
Average
Annual Water Average
Water Cost
Cost (See
Household as a % of
Municipality Table 4)
Income*
Income
Kingsville
LaSalle
Tecumseh
Leamington
Windsor
Amherstburg
Lakeshore
Essex

$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$

282
387
421
441
472
493
578
580

78,942
103,034
99,800
65,713
62,175
86,116
95,625
74,902

0.36%
0.38%
0.42%
0.67%
0.76%
0.57%
0.60%
0.77%

Average
Annual Sanitary
Sewer Cost
(See Table 5)
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$

294
279
428
506
750
856
490
630

Combined
Water and
Combined
Sanitary Sewer Costs as a %
Costs
of Income
577
666
849
947
1,223
1,349
1,069
1,210

0.73%
0.65%
0.85%
1.44%
1.97%
1.57%
1.12%
1.62%

* (Statistics Canada, 2011)

As is illustrated in Table 6, in all eight communities examined in Southwestern Ontario,
water can be considered affordable for the average household. However, this consideration
looks at average income, and does not measure impact on the poorest residents, who must pay
the same price for drinking water as the wealthy. Water affordability will now be examined
against the minimum income amounts of Ontario’s three most prevalent income support
programs (ODSP, OW, and Guaranteed Income Supplement).

2.3 The Affordability of Water for the Poor in Southwestern Ontario
2.3.1 Defining the Poor
Ontario has established three primary income support programs for the poorest of
Ontario residents. While there are inevitably some residents who choose not to take
advantage of the guaranteed minimum income supplements associated with these
programs, for the purpose of this research, only the minimum income amounts under these

Page 44 of 57
programs will be examined. Thus if an eligible individual(s) elected not to take advantage of
the social assistance programs, they may survive on less than the minimum income amounts
discussed below.
Ontario Works
In the Province of Ontario, if a household does not have sufficient financial resources
to meet basic living expenses, they will be eligible for financial assistance through the
Ontario Works program. This income support is intended to help with the costs of basic
needs, like food, clothing and shelter (Ontario Ministry of Community and Social Services,
2016). This program can be considered the basic social assistance or ‘welfare’ program in
Ontario. The amount of financial assistance available will vary depending on the size of the
family, the location, and various living expenses.
Guaranteed Income Supplement (GIS)
To ensure a minimum income threshold for seniors in Canada, the Canadian Federal
Government provides a Guaranteed Income Supplement (GIS) program to low income seniors
(over the age of 65) who are also receiving the Old Age Security (OAS) benefit. The Guaranteed
Income Supplement ensures that each and every Canadian over the age of 65 receives no less
than $17,544 in annual income ($1,462 per month). Seniors earning less than $17,544 will
receive the supplement to raise their income to this minimum amount. Seniors with an income
greater than $17,544 will not receive the GIS (Government of Canada, 2016).
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iii)

Ontario Disability Support Program (ODSP)
The Ontario Disability Support Program (ODSP) provides income support for disabled

individuals living in Ontario who need financial help with basic living expenses. Much like OW
and GIS discussed above, the ODSP social assistance program is means tested, and ensures a
basic minimum amount of income for individuals with a disability.
A comparison of the minimum income amounts of the three main social assistance
programs in the province of Ontario, is provided below:
Table 7: Comparison of Minimum Annual Income for Social Assistance Programs in Ontario
Social
Assistance
Program

Single

Couple

Single- 1
Child

Single- 2
Children

Couple- 1
Child

Couple-2
Children

GIS/GAINS

$17,544

$23,184

X

X

X

X

OW

$8,472

$13,140

$12,948

$14,940

$15,132

$17,172

ODSP

$13,536

$19,896

$22,008

$20,256

$22,365

$24,564

Source: (Income Security Advocacy Centre, 2016), (Government of Canada, 2016)

2.3.2 Examination of Affordability of Water for the Poor in Southwestern Ontario
In Table 8 below, the minimum income amounts identified in Table 7 are used to
determine the affordability of water in the eight subject municipalities in Southwestern
Ontario. The total annual estimated cost of water in each municipality identified in Table 8, is
calculated using the actual 2016 water billing rate models for each municipality.
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Table 8: Affordability of Water for the Poor
Affordability of Water by Municipality (See Appendix A for further detail)
Social Assistance Program Income
Leamington % of Income Amherstburg % of Income
GIS/Gains
Single
$
17,544 $
325
1.9% $
338
1.9%
Couple
$
23,184 $
397
1.7% $
435
1.9%
OW
Single
$
8,472 $
325
3.8% $
338
4.0%
Couple
$
13,140 $
397
3.0% $
435
3.3%
Single- 1 Child
$
12,948 $
325
2.5% $
435
3.4%
Single- 2 Children
$
14,940 $
470
3.1% $
532
3.6%
Couple- 1 Child
$
15,132 $
470
3.1% $
532
3.5%
Couple-2 Children
$
17,172 $
542
3.2% $
629
3.7%
ODSP
Single
$
13,536 $
325
2.4% $
338
2.5%
Couple
$
19,896 $
397
2.0% $
435
2.2%
Single- 1 Child
$
22,008 $
325
1.5% $
435
2.0%
Single- 2 Children
$
20,256 $
470
2.3% $
532
2.6%
Couple- 1 Child
$
22,365 $
470
2.1% $
532
2.4%
Couple-2 Children
$
24,564 $
542
2.2% $
629
2.6%
Affordability of Water by Municipality (See Appendix A for further detail)
Social Assistance Program Income
Tecumseh
% of Income Lakeshore
% of Income
GIS/Gains
Single
$
17,544 $
255
1.5% $
367
2.1%
Couple
$
23,184 $
359
1.5% $
499
2.2%
OW
Single
$
8,472 $
255
3.0% $
367
4.3%
Couple
$
13,140 $
359
2.7% $
499
3.8%
Single- 1 Child
$
12,948 $
359
2.8% $
499
3.9%
Single- 2 Children
$
14,940 $
463
3.1% $
631
4.2%
Couple- 1 Child
$
15,132 $
463
3.1% $
631
4.2%
Couple-2 Children
$
17,172 $
566
3.3% $
763
4.4%
ODSP
Single
$
13,536 $
255
1.9% $
367
2.7%
Couple
$
19,896 $
359
1.8% $
499
2.5%
Single- 1 Child
$
22,008 $
359
1.6% $
499
2.3%
Single- 2 Children
$
20,256 $
463
2.3% $
631
3.1%
Couple- 1 Child
$
22,365 $
463
2.1% $
631
2.8%
Couple-2 Children
$
24,564 $
566
2.3% $
763
3.1%
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Table 8 Continued:
Affordability of Water by Municipality (See Appendix A for further detail)
Social Assistance Program Income
Essex
% of Income LaSalle
GIS/Gains
Single
$
17,544 $
363
2.1% $
Couple
$
23,184 $
498
2.1% $
OW
Single
$
8,472 $
363
4.3% $
Couple
$
13,140 $
498
3.8% $
Single- 1 Child
$
12,948 $
498
3.8% $
Single- 2 Children
$
14,940 $
634
4.2% $
Couple- 1 Child
$
15,132 $
634
4.2% $
Couple-2 Children
$
17,172 $
769
4.5% $
ODSP
Single
$
13,536 $
363
2.7% $
Couple
$
19,896 $
498
2.5% $
Single- 1 Child
$
22,008 $
498
2.3% $
Single- 2 Children
$
20,256 $
634
3.1% $
Couple- 1 Child
$
22,365 $
634
2.8% $
Couple-2 Children
$
24,564 $
769
3.1% $
Affordability of Water by Municipality (See Appendix A for further detail)
Social Assistance Program Income
Kingsville
% of Income Windsor
GIS/Gains
Single
$
17,544 $
150
0.9% $
Couple
$
23,184 $
233
1.0% $
OW
Single
$
8,472 $
150
1.8% $
Couple
$
13,140 $
233
1.8% $
Single- 1 Child
$
12,948 $
233
1.8% $
Single- 2 Children
$
14,940 $
315
2.1% $
Couple- 1 Child
$
15,132 $
315
2.1% $
Couple-2 Children
$
17,172 $
398
2.3% $
ODSP
Single
$
13,536 $
150
1.1% $
Couple
$
19,896 $
233
1.2% $
Single- 1 Child
$
22,008 $
233
1.1% $
Single- 2 Children
$
20,256 $
315
1.6% $
Couple- 1 Child
$
22,365 $
315
1.4% $
Couple-2 Children
$
24,564 $
398
1.6% $

% of Income
260
339

1.5%
1.5%

260
339
339
419
419
499

3.1%
2.6%
2.6%
2.8%
2.8%
2.9%

260
339
339
419
419
499

1.9%
1.7%
1.5%
2.1%
1.9%
2.0%

% of Income
362
431

2.1%
1.9%

362
431
431
500
500
569

4.3%
3.3%
3.3%
3.3%
3.3%
3.3%

362
431
431
500
500
569

2.7%
2.2%
2.0%
2.5%
2.2%
2.3%
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The results of the affordability examination of the eight subject municipalities in
Southwestern Ontario has revealed that the cost of water in these municipalities can, in almost
all circumstances, also be considered affordable. The only exceptions were identified in the
Ontario Works incomes as identified by the shaded cells.

Part 3: Improving Affordability and Equity through Water Pricing
Methodology
Municipalities wishing to implement intelligent and strategic tax policy to improve
affordability and social equity in their communities, can establish water rate models to achieve
the desired outcomes. While some rather unique water pricing methodologies have been
examined and implemented worldwide to improve social equity in water pricing, such as
inclining block tariff structures that are influenced by income and household size (Wasimi &
Hassa, 2012), (Barberán & Arbués, 2009), such an approach would likely prove impractical in
Ontario. Given the separation of jurisdictional authority between the Province of Ontario and
Ontario municipalities, attempting to collect, maintain, and verify this additional customer
information by municipalities for the sole purpose of determining household water rates would
prove complicated and administratively burdensome. As a result, it is suggested that the three
recommendations below would be practical and realistic considerations for Ontario
municipalities wishing to adopt a more equitable manner in which to charge for water and to
make water more affordable for those with the least ability to pay.
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3.1 Recommendation #1: Use Alternative Revenue Sources to Cover Costs
The generally accepted principle, and legislative requirement in Ontario (Safe Drinking
Water Act, 2002), that drinking water supply systems must have a fully sustainable financial
model is often misinterpreted to mean that direct user fees must be set at a value to achieve
full cost recovery. The notion that water supply systems must be fully self-sustaining through
rates alone, and that direct fees charged for the delivery of water must cover all costs, is not a
requirement in Ontario (Safe Drinking Water Act, 2002). Improving water affordability for low
income households could involve moving some of the costs of the treatment and supply of
drinking water away from user fees, and on to general taxation. There exists a long list of
publicly supplied goods and services which have characteristics similar to that of drinking water,
but that draw their funding from general taxation revenues such as property taxation, income
tax revenues, commodity taxes, etc. In the local government context, this includes services such
as recreation, sanitation, roads, and parks services. As a result, municipalities have the ability to
use other revenue sources, such as property taxation revenue or provincial transfer payments
(such as the unencumbered Ontario Municipal Partnership Fund (OMPF) for northern and rural
communities), to reduce the price of water for residential consumers. While property tax is not
typically considered progressive taxation, since property tax imposes taxes on the market value
of the home as opposed to the income of the homeowner and does not consider the ability to
pay, there nonetheless exists a correlation between the value of a home and the income of the
homeowner (Hancock, 2004).
Water should not be isolated and treated as a distinct public good simply because
consumption is easily measured. Much like the greater societal benefits derived from a publicly
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funded health care system, providing clean, safe drinking water to residents has far reaching
societal benefits and should not be approached as a commercial business transaction.

3.2 Recommendation #2: Use Strategic Inclining Block Tariff Structures
Only 9% of Ontario Municipalities are currently using inclining block tariff structures,
while 65% use a uniform rate model (BMA, 2015). Inclining block structures have the benefit of
permitting those with the least ability to pay, to consume less water and pay a lower rate for
the water they consume. Wealthier customers, who consume more water than the poor
(Wasimi & Hassa, 2012), would pay a higher cost for the water consumed above established
thresholds.
It has been suggested that the water required to meet basic human needs and promote
heath is 50 liters(L) per person per day (5L drinking water, 20L sanitation, 15L bathing, 10L food
preparation) (Gleick, 1999). Given that the average Canadian consumes over five times this
amount at 251 liters per person per day (Environment Canada, 2011), it is clear that Canadians
are excessive users of water. Despite this, and in recognition of the basic human right to water,
it is recommended that a lifeline volume of water should be provided to each residential
customer at minimal, to no charge. The lifeline quantity could be established at 130L per
household day, or 4 cubic meters of water per residential customer per month (50 liters*2.6
persons*30days). Beyond this lifeline amount, the cost and volume included in the various
block structures can be strategically established to promote conservation and give those with
the least ability to pay to control their water consumption if they wish to do so.
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3.3 Recommendation #3: Reduce Fixed Charges
High fixed charges reduce the incentive to conserve and results in those using less water
per billing cycle, paying a higher average cost per unit of water consumed (the fixed costs are
spread over less units consumed) . Residential customers that pay a fixed fee for water, as
opposed to metered charges, use 65% more water per capita (Environment Canada, 2014). The
higher the fixed fees, the more the billing structure will resemble a fixed fee model. As a result,
fixed charges should make up a very minimal part of the average residential water bill. While
determining the recommended fixed charge percentage of the bill is beyond the scope of this
paper, it is suggested that a municipality’s tolerance for managing revenue instability will play a
large role in that determination. The higher the tolerance for revenue instability, the greater
the ability to establish lower fixed charges. Of the eight municipalities examined in this paper,
fixed costs made up 45% of the water bill on average (Table 4).

3.4 Conclusion
This paper has demonstrated that in the eight communities examined in Southwestern
Ontario, residential drinking water can be considered quite affordable for the average
household, and generally affordable even for the poorest households. Despite this affordability,
this paper has also demonstrated that through establishing and implementing intelligent tax
policy, municipalities can determine pricing strategies that shift some of the cost burden from
those with the least ability to pay, to those with a greater ability to pay.
Further research topics related to this report include examining and identifying the
optimal percentage of fixed fees in relation to the total average cost of water. This optimal
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percentage would promote conservation and improve affordability for those with the least
ability to pay. Additionally, defining the optimal ‘blocks’ in the inclining block ratio model, both
from a volumetric as well as a cost perspective, will aid municipalities in determining a cost
structure most likely to result in their desired policy outcomes. Understanding the factors that
influenced municipalities to adopt more sophisticated pricing strategies, like the 32% of the 100
municipalities surveyed in the 2015 BMA Study who have adopted inclining , declining and
humpback tariff pricing, would assist decision makers in advancing their own public policy
agenda. Finally, research that examines what social factors, if any, Ontario municipalities have
considered historically when establishing water pricing models, will help gain an appreciation
for the current level of sophistication in the process of establishing municipal tax policy in this
area.
While affordability examines the ability to pay, equity examines the fairness in the cost
structure. With so much focus on quality assurance and regulatory compliance in the water
sector in Ontario in the aftermath of the Walkerton tragedy, it is important to engage in
conversation regarding access to water, affordability of water, intelligent tax policy, and equity
in water pricing.
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